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STANDING UNDER STATE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
PROVISION: WHY THE MINNESOTA SUPREME
COURT SHOULD HAVE REJECTED THE FEDERAL
STANDARDS AND INSTEAD INVOKED GREATER
PROTECTION UNDER ITS OWN CONSTITUTION IN
STATE V CARTER
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Carter,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a crimi-
nal defendant had "standing"2 to challenge an alleged search under the Fourth
Amendment and Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. The defen-
dant moved to suppress 3 evidence obtained by a police officer who had peered in
the window of an apartment where the defendant was participating in a drug-pack-
aging operation with the apartment's leaseholder.4 A divided court held that the
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. 5 Therefore,
the defendant had standing to challenge the legality of the police officer's observa-
tions pursuant to the Fourth Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution, and
Article 1, Section 107 of the Minnesota Constitution. 8 The court concluded that
the police officer's observations constituted an unreasonable search. 9
*Acknowledgment: I would like to thank Professor Melvyn Zarr for his guidance and sug-
gestions in helping me refine this piece.
1. 569 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct. 469 (1998).
2. Fourth Amendment standing issues are not based on the traditional standing doctrine of
Article III of the Constitution. Rather, the Fourth Amendment standing requirement is specific
to the Fourth Amendment and requires a party to assert her own rights in order to challenge an
alleged search. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498-99 (1975) (determining that Article
III requires plaintiffs to demonstrate the sufferance of an injury sufficient to warrant judicial
intervention), with United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1980) (rejecting the "auto-
matic standing" rule and requiring the party challenging the legality of a search to establish that
she was the victim of an invasion of privacy to bring suit).
3. In Fourth Amendment cases, the defendant raises the standing issue by filing a motion to
suppress evidence. See FED. R. CRmI. P. 12(b)(3).
4. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 173.
5. See id. at 176.
6. The Fourth Amendment provides in its entirety:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
7. Article 1, Section 10 is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment. See MINN. CONsT. art.
I, § 10.
8. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 176.
9. See id. at 178-79. In State v. Carter, the court applied an analysis to the fact pattern at three
levels. First, the court analyzed whether the defendant had standing to challenge the alleged
search. See id. at 173-76. The court then analyzed whether the government agent's actions
constituted a search. See id. at 176-78. Finally, the court determined whether the search was
unreasonable. See id. at 178-79. This Note will only directly address the standing issue.
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision, and held that the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy at the apartment.' 0 The Court justified this determination by focusing
on the defendant's status as a temporary guest and the fact that he was at the pre-
mises solely for commercial purposes. I I As a result, the Court denied him stand-
ing to challenge whether the police officer's observations constituted an unreason-
able search. 12
The Court's decision in Minnesota -. Carter and the Minnesota Supreme Court's
faulty analysis under the federal standards indicate that state courts should aban-
don the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudential standards. This Note will spe-
cifically address the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Carter, and how the
court's analysis is illustrative of a problem that has developed with the federal
Fourth Amendment standing requirement. 13 The United States Supreme Court
currently applies a privacy-based analysis to determine whether a defendant can
challenge an alleged search. 14 The analysis is two-fold; the Court requires a de-
fendant to demonstrate that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the in-
vaded place and that society recognizes the expectation as reasonable. 15 In like
manner, whether a visitor has a legitimate expectation of privacy at another prop-
erty possessor's premises is measured by the relationship between the host and the
guest and whether society recognizes that relationship as reasonable. 16
Adhering to the federal standards, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the
latter standard in Carter and, as a result, was placed in the tenuous position of
10. See Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct 469, 474 (1998).
11. See id. at 473-74.
12. See id.
13. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy or
Security?, 33 VAxE FOREsr L. Rnv. 307, 367 (1998) (criticizing courts and commentators for
overlooking the premise that the Fourth Amendment acts negatively, to exclude the intrusion of
government agents, and provides an affirmative right to privacy); Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond
Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting
Pretext Arrests, 69 U. CoLo. L. REv. 693, 706 (1998) (recognizing doubt in the academic field
regarding whether privacy is an adequate measure for protecting Fourth Amendment values);
Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman's" Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Govern-
ment and Citizen?, 94 CoLUm. L. Rav. 1751, 1754 (1994) (discussing the inadequacies of pri-
vacy as the standard for assessing government intrusions under the Fourth Amendment); Kent
M. Williams, Note, Property Rights Protection Under Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota
Constitution: A Rationale for Providing Possessory Crimes Defendants with Automatic Stand-
ing to Challenge Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 75 MiNN. L. REv. 1255, 1257 (1991)
(considering whether Minnesota courts should construe Article 1, Section 10 to protect property
interests as well as privacy interests).
14. See United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77,79-81 (1993); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 9 1,
98 (1990); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,315 (1987) (Brennan, I., dissenting); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740.41 (1979);
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
The Supreme Court's historical and current treatment of the clause "and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause," U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV., is beyond the scope of this Note.
15. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143 (stating that Katz r. United States provides guidance
in analyzing Fourth Amendment cases. See 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(establishing that a person must have "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and ... that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'").
16. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99-100.
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addressing why society should value the relationship between the leaseholder and
the defendant, when their relationship was centered around an illegal activity. 17
Explaining that society values a leaseholder's right to engage in a "common task"
with a guest, 18 the court produced a result that comports with the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment. 19 The court's reliance on the privacy-based standard, how-
ever, is misguided. In following the Supreme Court's standards, the court focused
on the defendant's illegal activities instead of the police officer's intrusive ac-
tions.2 0 Among other things, this approach jeopardizes the broader aims of the
Fourth Amendment: to protect a person's right to be secure from an unwarranted
governmental intrusion.2 1
This Note will criticize the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis in Carter,
concluding that the court should have discarded the privacy-based standard. This
analysis will integrate the recent United States Supreme Court reversal of State v.
Carter, and the Author intends to demonstrate the increasing subjectivity of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in the area of guest cases. Thus, instead of following
the Supreme Court's standards, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have ana-
lyzed the facts in Carter under its own state constitutional search and seizure pro-
vision, thereby adopting a standing rule that is textually based and supported by
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.2 2
Part II of this Note provides a brief survey of the significant developments in
the area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This endeavor begins with a review
of the framers' intentions for enacting the amendment. Next, the Author explores
how. the United States Supreme Court first grounded Fourth Amendment protec-
tions in common law property foundations. 2 3 Then, in the 1960s the Court adopted
"automatic standing" for defendants raising Fourth Amendment violations.2 4 In
the 1970s, the Court rejected the automatic standing rule and subsequently devel-
oped the current analytical framework for Fourth Amendment determinations: a
privacy-based analysis accompanied by a reasonableness balancing test that has
endured for thirty years and is currently the primary means for delineating Fourth
Amendment protections.2 5
17. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1997).
18. Seeid.
19. See discussion infra Part II.A.
20. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 173.
21. See discussion infra Parts II.A., IV.
22. See, e.g., Jones v. United States 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the Supreme Court
determined that by simply filing a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant had standing. See
id. at 264. To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would be putting the defendant in a position
where he or she would have to produce evidence that the state could later use as a basis for
conviction. See id. This constitutional dilemma is a "counterposition of Fourth Amendment
protection against the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination." Commonwealth
v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 461 (Pa. 1983).
The Court later explicitly rejected the automatic standing rule, relying on a subsequent Court
ruling prohibiting the government from using a defendant's suppression hearing testimony as an
admission in its case. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (citing Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968)).
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.
24. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
25. See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
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Part IV integrates the background information with the facts of the subject
case, as presented in Part III, to demonstrate how the Minnesota Supreme Court's
application of the privacy-based standard to the facts in Carter produced a correct
result, albeit based on a poorly reasoned analysis. This Note suggests that the
Minnesota Supreme Court's reliance upon privacy as the measure of Article 1,
Section 10 rights, and derivatively in the context of Fourth Amendment rights, as
illustrated by Carter, no longer adequately defines the proper limits on govern-
ment intrusions. Furthermore, a review of fairly recent federal and state court
decisions supports the contention that the Minnesota Supreme Court should pro-
vide greater protection to its alleged possessory crimes defendants by expanding
the protections under its own constitution.
This Note concludes that until the Supreme Court affords criminal defendants
adequate protection under the Fourth Amendment, state courts generally should
broaden protections under their own constitutions. That is, instead of basing standing
on a person's privacy interest, state courts should simply require a defendant to
prove that she was a guest at the time of the search in order to challenge an alleged
government intrusion. This approach evidences a return to the framers' intentions
and the Court's initial standards, while at the same time providing an adequate
measure for search and seizure protections.
IL BACKGROUND
A. The Framers' Intent
The Fourth Amendment was created to protect persons from indiscriminate
searches and seizures of private property by government agents.2 6 Its purpose
took root in the genesis of the American Revolution.27 The years leading up to the
Revolution were marked by the colonists' fears of, and aversions to, the British
entering their homes and searching for contraband.2 8 As explained by the Su-
preme Court, the Fourth Amendment was created as a specific reaction to "the
ransacking by Crown officers of the homes of citizens in search of evidence of
crime or of illegally imported goods."2 9
26. See Craig Hemmens, I Hear You Knocking: The Supreme Court Revisits the Knock and
Announce Rule, 66 UMKC L. Ray. 559, 602 n.82 (1998) (explaining how the British writ of
assistance permitted customs officials to "enter and go into any house, shop, cellar, warehouse
or room or other place, and in case of resistance, to break open any doors, chests, trunks and
other packages, there to seize and from thence to bring, any kinds of goods or merchandise
whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed") (citing NEsON BERNARD LAsso, THE 1isrRy AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FoURH AMENDMENT TO THE CoNsrnoi oF Tm UNrrED STATES (1937)).
For a comprehensive discussion of the substantive origins of the Fourth Amendment, see
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YA. I J. 393 (1995).
27. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging the history that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment as marked by abuses pro-
foundly "felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution").
28. See Hernmens, supra note 26.
29. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,363 (1959).
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B. Property-Based Approach
The Supreme Court initially defined the interests secured by the Fourth Amend-
ment primarily in terms of property rights. 30 In so doing, the Court limited Fourth
Amendment protections to property interests by requiring defendants to show an
ownership or possessory interest in a searched or seized object in order to prove a
violation.3 1 Adhering to a very literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court defined a search in terms of whether a person's property rights were violated
by a government agent's intrusion of a material entity-"persons, houses, papers,
and effects."'32
C. Privacy-BasedApproach
During the mid-twentieth century, the property-based approach was deemed
to be an insufficient approach to Fourth Amendment cases. Among other things,
the approach failed to take into consideration the right of a person to be secure
from a search while visiting another property owner's premises. For example, in
Jones v. United States,33 the Court rejected the property-based approach and in-
30. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Supreme Court held that the
government had violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by serving him with a sub-
poena to produce an invoice for the contents of a shipment in the defendant's possession and by
retaining the goods. The government's actions constituted a violation, the Court maintained,
because the defendant had a superior property interest in the seized goods. See id. at 637.
31. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1
(1932).
32. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Supreme Court recognized that
"[t]he well-known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general war-
rants and writs of assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's
house, his person, his papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his will." Id. at
463 (citing U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV).
33. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). In
Jones, the defendant was charged with a two-count indictment after the government found narcot-
ics in the apartment where he was staying as a guest. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at
258-59. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence and the government opposed the defendant's
standing because he had failed to allege either an ownership of the seized articles or a property
interest in the apartment. See id. at 259.
The Court in Jones based its holding, in part, on the dilemma faced by a criminal defendant:
should a criminal defendant claim that he possessed the contraband in order to assert standing
and thereby essentially admit to the crime, or, should the defendant remain silent and forego this
possible defense? The Jones court explained:
Ordinarily ... it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality
of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he allege, and if the
allegation be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion
of privacy. But prosecutions like this one have presented a special problem. To
establish "standing," Courts of Appeals have generally required that the movant claim
either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial
possessory interest in the premises searched. Since narcotics charges like those in the
present indictment may be established through proof solely of possession of narcot-
ics, a defendant seeking to comply with what has been the conventional standing
requirement has been forced to allege facts the proof of which would tend, if indeed
not be sufficient, to convict him. At the least, such a defendant has been placed in the
criminally tendentious position of explaining his possession of the premises. He has
been faced, not only with the chance that the allegations made on the motion to sup-
press may be used against him at the trial .... but also with the encouragement that he
perjure himself if he seeks to establish "standing" while maintaining a defense to the
charge of possession.
Id. at 261-62.
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stead granted a defendant "automatic standing" to challenge the constitutionality
of the search of an apartment where he had been visiting at the time of the govern-
ment agent's intrusion.3 4 Because he was a guest, the Court determined that the
defendant was "legitimately on [the searched] premises" and accordingly granted
him standing to challenge the government action.3 5
Whether a criminal defendant was granted "automatic standing" therefore
hinged upon whether the criminal defendant was legitimately on the searched pre-
mises, a rather low burden to satisfy. The Court rationalized that requiring a crimi-
nal defendant to prove possession of contraband would put her in the tendentious
position of essentially making an admission to a crime in order to challenge an
alleged Fourth Amendment violation. 36 Thus, the Court announced the rule known
as "automatic standing":
[TMo hold that petitioner's failure to acknowledge interest in the narcotics or the
premises prevented his attack upon the search, would be to permit the Govern-
ment to have the advantage of contradictory positions as a basis for conviction.
[The criminal defendant's] conviction flows from his possession of the narcotics
at the time of the search. Yet the fruits of that search, upon which the conviction
depends, were admitted into evidence on the ground that petitioner did not have
possession of the narcotics at that time. The prosecution here thus subjected the
defendant to the penalties meted out to one in lawless possession while refusing
him the remedies designed for one in that situation. It is not consonant with the
amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal justice, to sanction
such squarely contradictory assertions of power by the Government. 37
The Court further held that the government agent's intrusive action had violated
the defendant's right to privacy at the premises. 38 The Jones "automatic standing"
rule was later discarded by the Court,39 however, and it has been replaced by the
privacy-based standard.
34. See id. at 267.
35. See id. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the earlier property ownership require-
ment:
[I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitu-
tional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property
law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions
whose validity is largely historical.... Distinctions such as those between "lessee,"
"licensee," "invitee" and "guest:' often only of gossamer strength, ought not to be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards.
Id. at 266.
36. See id. at 261-62.
37. lId at 263-64 (announcing rule and stating that "the same element in this prosecution
which has caused a dilemma... eliminates any necessity for a preliminary showing of an inter-
est in the premises searched or the property seized, which ordinarily is required when standing is
challenged").
38. See id. at261.
39. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978) (discarding the "automatic standing"
rule); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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In the landmark case, Katz v. United States,40 the Court eliminated the notion
that strict concepts of property law define Fourth Amendment protections.4 1 By
announcing that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, ' 4 2 and not places, the
Court effectively linked the Fourth Amendment's core protections to a person's
privacy interests. Thus, a person's property interest no longer controlled a govern-
ment agent's right to invade a place. 43 The Court in Katz additionally clarified the
determination that Fourth Amendment standing issues are not decided solely upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into an enclosure.44
In his widely cited concurrence, 45 Justice Harlan, in Katz, effectuated a two-
fold requirement for establishing standing based on a person's privacy rights. 46
To be granted standing, a person must demonstrate an "actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy" in the place searched. Additionally, a person must demonstrate
an "expectation of privacy" that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable. ' 47
To date, Justice Harlan's privacy-based standard generally governs whether a court
will grant standing to a person challenging a search under the Fourth Amendment. 48
Since its decision in Katz, the Supreme Court has reinforced the notion that
property rights are not a central concern in Fourth Amendment cases by formally
rejecting the Jones "legitimately on the premises" test.49 The Court adopted Jus-
tice Harlan's Katz test without concern over the self-incrimination problem posed
to the Jones Court because in Simmons v. United States50 the Court had recently
determined that a criminal defendant's testimony given in support of a motion to
suppress could not be admitted as evidence of guilt.5 1 The Court reasoned that
otherwise, the admitted testimony could later be used to incriminate the defen-
dant.52 This dilemma could result in the infringement of the defendant's Fifth
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court considered whether or not to exclude evidence
that the government had obtained by installing an electronic listening and recording device on
the outside of a telephone booth. See id. at 348. Arguing that the defendant's rights had not been
violated because the surveillance technique did not physically penetrate the telephone booth
from which the defendant placed his calls, the government failed to persuade the Court that the
defendant's expectation of privacy from governmental intrusion was unreasonable. See id. at
351-52.
41. See id. at 353.
42. Id.
43. See id. (citing Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
44. See id.
45. See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
46. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
47. See id. at 361.
48. See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
49. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 135 (1978); United States v; Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980). The defendants in Rakas challenged the police officers' search of a car in which the
defendants were passengers in order to exclude the evidence of a rifle and ammunition that had
been used in an armed robbery. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 130. The Court rejected the
defendants' argument that they were legitimately on the premises. See id. at 132. Instead, the
Court held that the Jones test was "overbroad" and determined that "the better analysis forth-
rightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment,
rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing." Id. at
139.
50. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
51. See id. at 389-90.
52. See id. at 391.
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Amendment right against self-incrimination. Thus, the Court held that "when a
defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on
the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection. ' 5 3
With the self-incrimination dilemma eliminated by the Court in Simmons, the
Court subsequently imposed a higher burden of proof on a defendant attempting to
establish standing. In United States v. Salvucci,54 the Court formally abolished the
automatic standing rule:
To conclude that a prosecutor engaged in self-contradiction in Jones, the Court
necessarily relied on the unexamined assumption that a defendant's possession
of a seized good sufficient to establish criminal culpability was also sufficient to
establish Fourth Amendment "standing." This assumption, however, even if cor-
rect at the time, is no longer so.... We simply decline to use possession of a
seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.5 5
As a result of the Court's holding in Salvucci, defendants are no longer granted
automatic standing under the federal standards. Instead, standing depends upon
"whether the disputed search ... has infringed an interest of the defendant that the
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect."56 The Court continues to apply the
Katz analytical framework to Fourth Amendment cases to answer this query.57
The Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has indisputably moved
from an interpretation protecting only property rights to one protecting only pri-
vacy rights. For example, in Minnesota v. Olson,5 8 the Court held that an over-
night guest had a reasonable expectation of privacy at another property owner's
premises. 59 Applying the Katz test to the facts of the case, the Court determined
that the defendant's status as an overnight guest was sufficient to prove that he had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises that society recognized as rea-
sonable. 60 In making its determination, the Court analyzed the relationship be-
tween the host and the guest.6 1 Because a host would most likely respect his or her
guest's right to privacy, the Court granted the defendant standing to challenge the
warrantless arrest.62 The Court produced a just result in Olson. In Carter, how-
ever, the Minnesota Supreme Court inappropriately extended the Olson standards
and consequently was led astray.
III. THE CARTER DECISION
In State v. Carter,63 the defendant, Wayne Thomas Carter filed a motion to
suppress evidence claiming that a police officer had unlawfully obtained the evi-
53. See id. at 394.
54. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
55. See id. at 90-92.
56. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 140.
57. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
58. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
59. See id. at 96-97.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 99-100.
62. See id. at 100.
63. 569 N.V.2d 169 (Minn. 1997).
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dence by peering into the apartment where the defendant allegedly had been en-
gaging in a drug-packaging operation. 64 After applying the Katz analytical frame-
work to the facts of the case, the district court determined that the defendant did
not have standing to challenge the police officer's observations because the defen-
dant failed to prove that his expectation of privacy in the apartment was based
upon understandings that were "recognized and permitted by society." 65 Further-
more, the district court held that the police officer's observations did not constitute
an unreasonable search because he had made his observations from an area where
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 66 Thus, the dis-
trict court denied, based on insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant's mo-
tion. 67
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision and held that the
defendant did not have standing to challenge the police officer's observations. 68
Because the defendant was not an "overnight guest" and had only been at the pre-
mises for business purposes, the court of appeals determined that he was not en-
titled to have standing. 69
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and granted the defendant
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the police officer's observations. 70
In making its determination, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the Katz ana-
lytical framework to the facts in Carter.7 1 Because the defendant was inside the
apartment with the doors shut and the blinds drawn, the court held that he had a
subjective expectation of privacy.7 2 Whether society recognized the defendant's
expectation of privacy as reasonable posed a more difficult question to the court.
Although the court of appeals had relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in
Olson in making its determination that the defendant did not have standing be-
cause he was not an "overnight guest,"'73 the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted
the Court's holding in Olson differently. By looking at the Court's history of re-
jecting arcane distinctions between terms like "guest" and "invitees 74 and its re-
64. See id. at 173. After an informant tipped him off, the police officer approached the
apartment window and observed the defendant, the leaseholder of the apartment, and another
man measuring and bagging a white substance at the kitchen table. As these people attempted to
drive out of a nearby parking lot, the police apprehended the defendant and the third man with-
out first obtaining a warrant. The evidence confiscated from the vehicle consisted of one duffel
bag containing a digital gram scale dusted with cocaine residue. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. The district court subsequently convicted the defendant for conspiring to commit
a controlled-substance crime in the first degree, and aiding and abetting a controlled-substance
in the first degree. See id.
67. See State v. Carter, 545 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the district
court relied solely on the evidence presented by the defense proving only that the defendant was
an out-of-state resident and that he had only been at the apartment for a short period of time on
the day of his arrest).
68. See id. at 698.
69. See id. at 697. But see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (granting standing).
70. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1997).
71. See id. at 174-76.
72. See id. at 174.
73. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. at 98 (1990).
74. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960) (stating that distinctions between
terms like "'invitee' and 'guest' ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ulti-
mately referable to constitutional safeguards").
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luctance to base an individual's standing on whether the individual was "legiti-
mately on [the] premises," 75 the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the
court of appeals had applied the wrong standing analysis. 76 Instead of identifying
a person's status as a "guest" or as an "overnight guest," the proper inquiry, ac-
cording to the Minnesota Supreme Court, is whether, under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, a person's "subjective expectation of privacy" is the type that "soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 7 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the Court granted standing to
the defendant in Olson based on the notion that a host respects his or her guest's
right to privacy.78 Applying this reasoning to the facts in Carter, the legitimacy of
the defendant's expectation of privacy hinged upon whether his status in relation
to his host was the type that served a function that is recognized as valuable by
society.7 9 The court analyzed the relationship and concluded:
Although society does not recognize as valuable the task of bagging cocaine, we
conclude that society does recognize as valuable the right of property owners or
leaseholders to invite persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct a com-
mon task, be it legal or illegal activity. We, therefore, hold that [the defendant]
had standing to bring his motion to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of
[the police officer's] observations. 80
Because the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apart-
ment and the police officer had taken "extraordinary measures" to make his obser-
vations, the court held that the police officer's actions constituted a search. 8 1 Fi-
nally, the court held that without probable cause and a search warrant, the police
officer had conducted an unreasonable search. 82
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CARTER DECISION
Despite the inadequacies of the privacy-based standard, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court produced a just result in Carter. Society values the right of property
possessors to invite guests to their premises to engage in a common task. Further-
more, by determining that the defendant had standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the police officer's observations, the court promoted the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to protect a person's right to be secure in a home from an
unwarranted governmental intrusion. 83
75. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 147 (1978) (rejecting blind adherence to the phrase
"legitimately on [the] premises" based on its "superficial clarity").
76. See State v. Carter, 569 N.V.2d at 174-75.
77. See id. at 175.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 176.
81. See id. at 176-78. The court found that the defendant manifested his expectation of
privacy in the apartment by taking precautions to keep his activities private. See id. at 177. In
contrast, the police officer had to take great measures to observe the interior of the apartment.
He left the public sidewalk, crossed the adjacent lawn, climbed over some bushes, and placed
his face 12 to 18 inches from the window to peer between the gaps of the blinds. See id. at 178.
82. See if. at 178-79.
83. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, by adopting the federal standards and relying on the United States
Supreme Court's privacy-based standard, the Minnesota Supreme Court produced
a just result that is supported by a weak foundation. The Minnesota court's analy-
sis is flawed because it focuses on the leaseholder's right to engage in an activity
and thereby extend protections to the defendant. 84 Thus, whether the defendant
had standing hinged upon whether his status in relation to his host served a func-
tion recognized as valuable by society. 85 The court explained that even though
society does not value the activity of drug packaging, it does value the right of a
property owner to invite a guest onto her premises in order to engage in a common
task, despite the illegality of the activity.8 6
This analysis is critically flawed for several reasons. First, by relying on the
privacy-based standard to determine standing, the court overlooked the primary
purpose of the Fourth Amendment. That is, the amendment is not based on notions
of privacy, rather it is based on the right of a person to exclude: the proper analyti-
cal measure to protect a person's right to be secure.87 Instead of analyzing the
defendant's relationship to the leaseholder,88 therefore, the court should have fo-
cused on the police officer's intrusive actions. By measuring the defendant's pro-
tections in this manner, the court would have conducted an analysis that properly
secures Fourth Amendment protections.
Next, the privacy-based standard is an inadequate measure of Fourth Amend-
ment protections because it has no textual support in the language of the amend-
ment. The standard also leaves the malleable concept of privacy to the subjective
interpretation of court majorities, as demonstrated by the court in Carter.89 The
court could have declined to extend standing to the defendant in Carter because
society does not value the activity of drug smuggling.9 0 In fact, the dissent in
Carter opined that the defendant should have been denied standing based partly on
his involvement in an illegal activity.9 1 The disagreement among the justices on
84. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 176.
85. See id.
86. See iL
87. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The amendment, in relevant part, provides: "[t]he right of
the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...
"' Id. See also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (focusing on whether there is a
"reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion"); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is
at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society.").
88. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 176.
89. See Clancy, supra note 13, at 339 (describing the variable nature of the privacy-based
standard).
90. See United States v. Lockett, 919 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1990). Lockett involved the federal
"knock and announce statute," 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1988). See id. at 587. The Ninth Circuit
applied the privacy-based analysis to determine whether the defendant had standing to chal-
lenge the police officer's intrusion into the apartment where he was engaging in a drug-packag-
ing operation. See id. at 588. The court reasoned that the defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy sufficient to challenge an unannounced police entry because he had been
using the apartment for drug smuggling. See id.
Other jurisdictions have denied standing based on a defendant's participation in an illegal
activity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Price, 562 N.E.2d 1355 (Mass. 1990). But see State v.
Keeling, 182 N.E.2d 60, 67-68 (Ohio Misc. 1962) (standing is not affected by a defendant's
participation in an illegal activity).
91. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 179-80 (Stringer, J., dissenting). The dissent also
noted the defendant's status as a "brief" and "transient visitor" at the apartment. See id. at 180.
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this particular issue illustrates the highly subjective, and therefore problematic
nature of the Court's privacy-based standard.92
Additionally, to deny standing to a defendant based on her participation in an
illegal activity is antithetical to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. The cogni-
zable intent of the framers was to secure a person from an unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion. 93 The framers intended to provide indiscriminate protection,
despite a person's participation in an illegal activity.94
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the history and purpose of the Fourth
Amendment that a person's expectation of privacy hinges on their abstention from
an illegal activity. Instead, the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted broadly
to err on the protective side.95 Curiously, the Minnesota Supreme Court's reliance
on the privacy-based standard to protect a person's privacy rights has produced an
analysis that could result in compromising Fourth Amendment protections, 96 as
illustrated by the dissent in Carter.97
The recent Supreme Court holding in Minnesota v. Carter98 provides further
evidence that the privacy-based standard is an inadequate measure of Fourth Amend-
ment protections. First, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, denied the
defendant standing based on the short duration of his stay at the apartment and the
commercially based purpose of his visit; in other words, his participation in pack-
aging cocaine. 99 By focusing on the defendant's privacy-based expectation, the
Court unjustifiably also focused on the defendant's illegal activities.
Also, the justices' various concurring and dissenting opinions in Minnesota v.
Carter lend further support to the proposition that the privacy-based standard is
damagingly subjective. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, suggesting that
the threshold question in Fourth Amendment cases should be simply whether a
search has occurred. 100 By framing the inquiry in this manner, courts can avbid
applying what Justice Scalia referred to as "the fuzzy standard of 'legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy."' 10 1
92. See Sundby, supra note 13, at 1758 (stating that the privacy-based analysis produced an
amendment that rises and falls "in both scope and protection based upon how the notion of
privacy fare[s] in the Court and within society as a whole").
93. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
94. See Henmens, supra note 26.
95. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) ("'Tlhere is nothing new in the realiza-
tion that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the
privacy of us all.").
96: See United States v. Smith, 783 F.2d 648, 650 (6th Cir. 1986) (denying standing because
defendant failed to meet the burden of establishing that his presence was not unlawful). See also
Melvin Gutterman, Note, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amend-
ment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRtcusE L. Ray. 647, 670-71
(1988) (criticizing the Katz analysis because it led to a trend in the reduction of Fourth Amend-
ment protections).
97. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 179-80 (Minn. 1997) (Stringer, J., dissenting).
98. 119 S.Ct. 469 (1998).
99. See id. at 473.
100. See id. at 474 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. Id. Justice Scalia concluded that this did not constitute a search because the apartment
was not the defendant's residence. See id. at 477 (adhering to a very literal constitutional inter-
pretation).
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Joining the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy agreed with the Chief Jus-
tice that standing should be denied. He added that the defendant had failed to
establish a "meaningful tie or connection to the owner, the owner's home, or the
owner's expectation of privacy." 10 2 Discussing the facts surrounding Police Of-
ficer Thielen's actions, Justice Breyer suggested that the Court should focus not on
the defendant's expectations, but rather analyze, and presumably prioritize, the
"unreasonable search" component of the three-part inquiry under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 103 On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, 104 noted the
sanctity of the home and advocated for the protection of guests who are invited by
the homeowner to "share the privacy of her home and her company with a guest." 105
The manner in which the Supreme Court came down in Minnesota v. Carter
illustrates the subjective nature of the privacy-based standard. Furthermore, after
this decision, there are many issues regarding Fourth Amendment "guest" cases
left unanswered. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion provides only that the facts
were not sufficient in this case to meet the privacy-based standing requirement.
The dissent's conclusive standard that guests are deserving of Fourth Amendment
protections, absent exigent circumstances, 106 is a better approach. This approach
not only provides guidance to state and federal courts, but it adequately measures
a host's and her guest's protections against invasions into the home. That is, pro-
tection is based on the host-guest relationship and precludes an analysis of the
purpose of the visit which needlessly raises a level of subjectivity with reviewing
judges. In conclusion, this Author's suggested test is simply an extension of the
Court's grant of protection in Minnesota v. Olson to an overnight guest in order to
avoid the pitfalls of the privacy-based standard.
V. FEDERAL AND STATE SUPPORT FOR GREATER PROTECTION UNDER THE
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION
A. Federal Support
Recent developments at the federal level would support Minnesota's rejection
of the privacy-based standard. First, the Fourth Amendment was specifically cre-
ated to protect against unwarranted intrusions into the home, what Justice Ginsburg
in Minnesota v. Carter referred to as "the most essential bastion of privacy recog-
nized by the law." 107 Thus, a guest should share the same protection as her host.
Not only is Justice Ginsburg's approach more easily applied by the lower courts,
but it is textually supported and provides adequate protection against governmen-
tal intrusions.
102. See id. at 479 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103. See id. at 480 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104. Justices Stevens and Souter joined Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion. See
Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 480-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 481-82. The dissent declined to address "classroom hypotheticals like the
[visitation of the home by] the milkman or pizza deliverer." Id. at 482 (alteration in original).
106. For example, the dissent noted the hypothetical milkman or pizza deliverer. See id. at
482.
107. See id. at 481 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,714 (1984)). Justice Kennedy
also stated that he thought all social guests should have standing, absent commercial guests. See
id. at 479.
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Next, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v. Carter, the Court
had acknowledged, in part, that the privacy-based approach may be inadequate at
defining Fourth Amendment protections. In Alderman v United States,103 for
example, the Court reaffirmed the framers' intentions that the Fourth Amendment's
purpose is to protect the security of both persons and property. 109 In his dissenting
opinion in. California v. Ciraolo, 1 10 Justice Powell recommended that the Court
adjust the privacy-based standard so that a court determines standing by analyzing
whether the government action has intruded upon the defendant's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, rather than by measuring a person's expectation of privacy in
terms of what society deems is reasonable. I II By framing the inquiry in this man-
ner, Justice Powell reasoned, the analysis would include both considerations of the
framers' intentions, and "our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion." 112
B. State Support
In addition to some of the Supreme Court justice's criticisms, a small number
of states have implied additional protections in their own constitutions to criminal
defendants. 113 By essentially granting defendants "automatic standing" to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of governmental actions, 114 these states have greatly
broadened the protections of their own unreasonable search and seizure provi-
sions. Instead of analyzing a defendant's expectation of privacy, a court that has
adopted automatic standing focuses on the government agent's alleged "search." 115
This approach furthers the broader aim of the Fourth Amendment to protect a
person's right to be secure from unwarranted governmental intrusions.
Over the last twenty years, the highest courts in nine states have adopted a rule
under their own state search and seizure provision that is more similar to the Jones
108. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
109. See id. at 175.
110. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). In Ciraolo, a divided Court denied a defendant's motion to sup-
press evidence because a police officer's warrantless aerial observation of the defendant's culti-
vated marijuana plants was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 209-10,
213-14. Strictly applying a Katz analysis, the Court determined that although the defendant had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his backyard, his expectation of privacy was unreason-
able because his backyard was visible from a public vantage point. See id. at 213-14. Explain-
ing that the defendant's backyard was within the curtilage of the home, Justice Powell dissented
claiming that "[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a [person] to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Id. at
220 (alteration in original) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
111. See id. at 218-20.
112. Id. at 220 (quoting Oliver v. Unites States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
113. See Williams, supra note 13, at 1268 n.53 (collecting cases where states have adopted an
automatic standing rule). See, e.g., State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202 (La. 1984); Commonwealth
v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990); State v. Settle, 447 A.2d 1284 (N.H. 1982); State v.
Alston, 440 A.2d 1311 (N.J. 1981); People v. Millan, 508 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 1987); State v.
Tanner, 745 P.2d 757 (Or. 1987); Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983); State v.
Wood, 536 A.2d 902 (Vt. 1987); State v. Simpson, 622 P.2d 1199 (Wash. 1980).
114. Automatic standing simply refers to a court granting a criminal defendant standing
because he has filed a motion to suppress evidence. See cases cited supra note 22.
115. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roland, 701 A.2d 1360, 1362-63 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(granting defendant automatic standing and accordingly analyzing police officer's "search").
automatic standing rule than the Katz privacy-based standard. 116 By so doing,
these states have functionally lowered the burden of proof that a criminal defen-
dant must bear to allege a search violation. Using this approach, these state courts
focus more on the alleged search and reasonableness of the search, rather than on
the Court's deficient and non-textually-based privacy standard.
One of the problems in this recent trend at the state level, however, is that the
states have not adopted uniform standards. That is, although most of the states
have rejected the privacy-based standard under Katz, there is no consensus regard-
ing the burden of proof that a criminal defendant must bear to attain "automatic
standing." Each state defines "automatic standing" using its own terms, thereby
creating confusion as to what the term "automatic standing" means.
For example, in State v. Owen,1 17 the Supreme Court of Louisiana recognized
the federal jurisprudential privacy rule that governs standing under the Fourth
Amendment, but invoked its own constitution to resolve the case's search issue. 18
In making its determination, the court noted that "although defendants do not have
standing under the [F]ourth [A]mendment absent a showing of a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the area searched, they have standing under [the state con-
stitution]." 119 As long as a defendant is "adversely affected" by an alleged uncon-
stitutional search, the Louisiana Supreme Court will grant a defendant standing to
challenge the admissibility of the evidence seized. 120
In Commonwealth v. Amendola,12 1 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, similar to the court in State v. Owen, referenced the federal standards pursu-
ant to searches and the Jones court reasoning. 122 The Amendola court concluded
that the principal concerns of the Jones court remained valid, "despite the current
Supreme Court's shift in thinking." 12 3 Thus, pursuant to Article 14 of the Massa-
116. See cases cited supra note 113.
117. 453 So.2d 1202 (La. 1984). The criminal defendants filed motions to suppress physical
evidence that had been seized pursuant to a warrantless search of a residence owned by a third
party. See id. at 1203. The case appeared before the Supreme Court of Louisiana after the
defendants were denied standing by the trial court. See id. The facts of the case provide that
several police officers knocked, and then entered the third party's trailer after a victim of an
armed robbery and assault reported the whereabouts of one of the perpetrators. See id. at 1203-
04. The owner of the trailer knowingly consented to the search of the premises, and the officers
discovered.items that belonged to the victim. See id. at 1204.
118. See id. at 1205. Louisiana's search and seizure provision provides, in relevant part:
"Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.... Any person ad-
versely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing
to raise its illegality in the appropriate court." LA. CONsT. art. 1, § 5.
119. State v. Owen, 453 So.2d at 1205.
120. See id.
121. 550 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990). The facts in Amendola are strikingly similar to those
found in Carter. In Amendola, the criminal defendant filed a motion to suppress items found in
two automobiles when he was faced with a potential conviction of possession of cocaine and
marijuana. See id. at 121. The officer involved in the case was tipped off by an informant that
a drug transaction was to take place in a shopping center parking lot. After observing a transac-
tion between several parties, the police officer approached one of the men and later searched the
car, discovering a packet of white powder and what appeared to be marijuana. See id. at 122.
Likewise, a search of the defendant's car resulted in the police officer's discovery of a balance
scale and a white powder (later identified as cocaine). See id.
122. See also discussion supra note 33.
123. See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d at 125.
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chusetts Declaration of Rights, 124 the court announced its adoption of the over-
ruled Jones automatic standing rule.12 5 The court qualified its adoption of the
Jones rule, however, stating that "[w]hile we consider it unnecessary to discard
completely expectation-of-privacy analysis for the purposes of this case, we do
recognize the risks in over-emphasizing such a manipulable standard while losing
sight of other important considerations, such as those which animate the automatic
standing rule." 12 6 The court established the rule that "[w]hen a defendant is charged
with a crime in which possession of the seized evidence at the time of the con-
tested search is an essential element of guilt, the defendant shall be deemed to have
standing to contest the legality of the search and the seizure of that evidence." 127
Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts limited the application
of this rule to cases involving automobile searches and house searches and left
other fact patterns where possession crimes are at issue to a case-by-case analy-
sis. 12 8
State v. Settle12 9 concerned the denial of a suppression motion brought by a
criminal defendant challenging the legality of a warrantless search of the premises
of a third party. Invoking its own constitution, 13 0 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire affirmatively concluded that the language of the state constitution re-
quires that "automatic standing" be "afforded to all persons within the State of
New Hampshire who are charged with crimes in which possession of any article or
thing is an element." 13 1 The court reasoned that cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court represent the application of only "the minimum standards required
in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable
searches." 132 Furthermore, the court in Settle recognized the Supreme Court's
rationale behind eliminating the automatic standing rule, 133 but regardlessly stated:
[A] strong argument in support of automatic standing may be made on the very
simple and practical premise that-for the benefit of law enforcement, the trial
courts, and the trial bar--that class of persons who may assert rights against
unlawful searches and seizures should be clearly defined... The protection of
124. Article 14 provides in relevant part: "Every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his house, his papers, and all his posses-
sions...." MAss. CoNsT., art. 14.
125. See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d at 125.
126. See id at 126.
127. See id.
128. See id at 126 n.4.
129. 447 A.2d 1284 (N.H. 1982). In Settle, police received the information that the defen-
dant was storing his guns at a third party's make-shift hut. They entered the hut, which did not
have a latch, observed the guns, and then proceeded to obtain a search warrant. See id. at 1285.
130. New Hampshire's search and seizure provision provides:
Every subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of
his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. Therefore, all warrants to
search suspected places ... are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation ... and with the formalities,
prescribed by law.
N.H.CorsT. pt. I, art. 19.
131. See State v. Settle, 447 A.2d at 1286 (emphasis added).
132. See id. (quoting People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1110 (1975)).
133. See supra notes 22 and 33 and accompanying text.
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constitutional rights and effective law enforcement will be better aided by a sim-
pler, less fact-specific test." 134
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. Alston, 135 also adopted the
Jones rule in a case where the defendant was charged with an offense in which the
possession of seized evidence at the time of the contested search was an essential
element of guilt. 136 Stating that automatic standing is a salutary rule, the court
criticized the use of a standing requirement as being wasteful. 137 Similarly, the
Court of Appeals of New York determined that constructive possession of a weapon
by a defendant was a sufficient predicate to give the defendant standing to chal-
lenge the search of a passenger compartment of a taxicab in which he was riding. 138
The Supreme Court of Oregon recognized the burdensome nature of a special
search and seizure standing requirement and determined that "[t]here is no issue of
[a] defendant's standing to challenge [an] unlawful search. A criminal defendant
always has standing to challenge the admission of evidence introduced by the
state."'139 Invoking the protections of the Oregon constitution, 14 0 the court stated
that "the term 'standing' should be used only in the narrow sense of capacity to
make a legal challenge." 14 1 Furthermore, the court rejected the notion that whether
134. State v. Settle, 447 A.2d at 1287. The court then explained how the "legitimate expec-
tation of privacy doctrine" beleaguers the judicial process. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
further explained "[a] recent First Circuit case that wrestled with the fact that the [privacy-
based] analysis might lead to differentiating among an object tied up in a rain slicker, one that is
wrapped in a slicker, and one merely lying under the slicker. See id. (citing United States v.
Weber, 668 F.2d 552, 561-62 (1st Cir. 1981) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting in part)). Furthermore, the
court in Settle pointed out the impracticality of the Katz analysis as it applies to the "policemen
on the street" who attempt to interpret and apply the test. See id. But see State v. Alosa, 623
A.2d 218, 220-22 (N.H. 1993) (declining to extend the automatic standing doctrine to a case
where the defendant was not charged with possession).
135. 440 A.2d 1311 (N.J. 1981). Alston is a classic automobile search case. After success-
fully apprehending a speeding car, the police in Alston, while peering in the window of the
vehicle, noticed shotgun shells in the open glove compartment. See id. at 1313. Upon closer
inspection, the police recovered a sawed-off shotgun from the vehicle and subsequently arrested
the passengers. See id. at 1314.
136. See id. at 1319-20.
137. See id. at 1320. The court stated that "[t]he automatic standing rule is a salutary one
which protects the rights of defendants and eliminates the wasteful requirement of making a
preliminary showing of standing in pretrial proceedings involving possessory offenses, where
the charge itself alleges an interest sufficient to support a Fourth Amendment claim." Id. (citing
United States v. Savucci, 448 U.S. 83, 97 (1980)).
138. See People v. Millan, 508 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 1987). But see People v. Ochsner, 159
A.D.2d 435, 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (applying "expectation of privacy" analysis to the facts
of the case because the defendant's crime involvement arose not only from a weapons charge,
but because of information that he might have been involved in an armed robbery).
139. State v. Tanner, 745 P.2d 757, 759 (Or. 1987). In State v. Tanner, the defendant moved
to suppress evidence uncovered by the police during an invalid warranted search of the defendant's
premises. See id. at 757-58.
140. The relevant state search and seizure provision provides:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall is-
sue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
OR. CONsT. art. I, § 9 (1998).
141. See State v. Tanner, 745 P.2d at 759.
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an interest is constitutionally protected hinges on whether the activity concerns
contraband, rather than stolen property. 142 Curiously, after making these state-
ments the court proceeded to apply an analysis based partly on privacy rights. 143
However, the Oregon court, unlike the Minnesota Supreme Court, recognized that
an individual's right1 44 to privacy was correctly measured by the individual's right
to exclude a government agent's intrusion. 14 5
Rejecting the Court's abolition of the automatic standing rule, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania recognized automatic standing for possessory crime defen-
dants in Comnonwealth v. Sell. 146 In resolving a dispute between the superior
court and the court of common pleas, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first recog-
nized its right to interpret its state constitution more liberally than the Court has
interpreted the Constitution. 147 Next, the court invoked its own search and seizure
provision1 4 8 and determined that the purpose of Article I, section 8 had not changed
142. See id. The court in Tanner recognized the paradox raised by the Court in Jones whereby
a possessory crimes defendant may implicate himlherself in a crime by raising the motion to
suppress. See id. at 759 n.3.
143. See id. at 760-63.
144. The Tanner court recognized the difference between interpreting the state constitution
to protect an individual's right to privacy, rather than their expectation of privacy under the state
constitution. See id. at 762 n.7 (emphasis added). It is interesting how the court applied a strict
constructionist approach to the nature of the right invaded, while at the same time implying a
privacy interest into the text of the state constitution.
145. See id. at 762. Cf. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (introducing the notion that privacy rights are measured in terms of what society
deems is reasonable).
The manner in which the Tanner court openly rejects a standing requirement for criminal
defendants to challenge evidence allegedly obtained by an illegal search while at the same time
applying a partial privacy-based analysis is puzzling. The Tanner court's analysis is more justi-
fiable than the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis in Carter because the privacy right is pre-
served in terms of the individual's right to exclude the government-the proper measure to
protect an individual's right to be secure.
146. 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983). In Sell a local police department executed a search warrant to
search an amusement arcade for firearms stolen after a robbery. See id. at 458-59. As a result of
the search, the police recovered a number of said firearms. The defendant, a partner in the
arcade business, was not present at the time of the search and therefore sought to exclude the
evidence via a motion to suppress. See id. at 459.
147. See id. The Sell court relied on commentary by Justice Brennan:
[The decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions re-
garding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law. Accordingly, such
decisions are not mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court judges
and the members of the bar seriously err if they so treat them. Rather, state court
judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal
courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying
due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guaran-
tees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting coun-
terpart state guarantees.
Id (quoting Justice Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977)).
148. Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any
person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
PA. Co sT. art. I, § 8.
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from its original purpose which was "to guarantee protection from unreasonable
governmental intrusion." 14 9
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to extend the Katz analytical
framework, and instead agreed with the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in
State v. Alston15 0 in its adherence to the automatic standing rule. 15 1 In conclusion,
the court remained convinced "that ownership or possession of the seized property
is adequate to entitle the owner or possessor thereof to invoke the constitutional
protection of Article I, section 8 by way of a motion to suppress its use as evi-
dence." 152
In State v. Wood,153 the Vermont Supreme Court made the similar argument
that current Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence is inconsistent with the original pur-
pose of the state's search and seizure provision. The court added that the plain
meaning of its state provision supported a return to the automatic standing rule. 154
In conducting its analysis, the court first criticized the current federal standards as
curtailing the "function of the judiciary by focusing on the defendant's ability to
present a challenge rather than on the challenge itself, and by unduly limiting the
class of defendants who may invoke the right to be free from unlawful searches
and seizures." 155
The Vermont Supreme Court then invoked its search and seizure provision
and stated that "the right of the people 'to hold themselves, their houses, papers,
and possessions, free from search and seizure' . . . premises the protected right
upon an objectively defined relationship between a person and the item seized or
place searched, as opposed to a subjective evaluation of the legitimacy of the
person's expectation of privacy in the area searched." 156 Therefore, the Vermont
Supreme Court declared that a possessory crimes defendant need only "assert a
possessory, proprietary or participatory interest in the item seized or the area
searched to establish standing." 157 Noting that the court in State v. Settle criti-
cized the federal standards as providing little guidance, 158 the Wood court deter-
mined that its standard, based on the possessory interest test, is easier to apply
"because it is based on an objective inquiry into the relationship between the sus-
pect and the item to be seized or the place searched." 159
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court was critical of the federal standards in
State v. Simpson. 160 Interestingly, in this case the Simpson court stated that the
149. See Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d at 467.
150. 440 A.2d 1311 (N.J. 1981), discussed supra notes 135-37.
151. See Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d at 468. The court noted that the Supreme Court's
"current use of the 'legitimate expectation of privacy' concept needlessly detracts from the criti-
cal element of unreasonable governmental intrusion." See id.
152. See id. at 469 (citing State v. Alston, 440 A.2d 1311 (N.J. 1981).
153. 536 A.2d 902 (Vt. 1987). In State v. Wood, the defendant claimed that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the product of a warrantless search of his trailer and
nearby vehicles by state police officers. See id. at 902-03. The vehicles were implicated in a
theft of stolen motorcycles. See id.
154. See id. at 904.
155. See id. at 908.
156. See id. (citing State v. Alston, 440 A.2d 1311, 1319 (N.J. 1981)).
157. See id.
158. 447 A.2d 1284 (N.H. 1982).
159. See State v Wood, 536 A.2d at 909.
160. 622 P.2d 1199 (Wash. 1980). In Simpson, the criminal defendant sought to suppress
evidence obtained by police officers who searched the stolen vehicle he had been driving after
they had put the defendant in jail. See id. at 1202-03.
[Vol. 51:2
19991 STANDING UNDER STATE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION 379
Supreme Court's holding in Simmons v. United States16 1 inadequately provided
protection against the self-incrimination dilemma because a prosecutor could still
use a defendant's suppression hearing testimony to impeach her at trial. 162 There-
fore, the court determined that the state constitution must be used to assign a "right
to assert a violation of privacy as a result of impermissible police conduct at least
in cases where, as [in State v. Simpson], a defendant is charged with possession of
the very item which was seized" to obviate the self-incrimination dilemma. 163
Thus, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a possessory interest automatic stand-
ing rule and provided greater protection against the self-incrimination dilemma.
The court raised an interesting loophole in the Simpson case and offered a compel-
ling reason for courts to grant automatic standing when a defendant is charged
with a possessory crime.
Although an analysis of the states that have rejected the privacy-based stan-
dard reveals the inconsistency in standards being applied by the states, it is clear
that all of these states have agreed that the federal Fourth Amendmentjurispruden-
tial standards are inadequate. That is, many state courts have recognized that the
privacy-based standard is not textually-based and does not adequately guarantee
Fourth Amendment protections. These courts criticize the privacy-based standard
as being too fact specific; 164 easily manipulable; 165 wasteful; 166 an inadequate
measure of search and seizure protections; 167 an aberrant standard that is not tex-
tually based; 168 overly burdensome and focused on the wrong party.169
V. RECOMMENDATION
The Minnesota Supreme Court has followed the Court's privacy-based stan-
dards in lock and step fashion over the last thirty years. 17 0 Before then, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, like the Court, held that the enjoyment of property rights
was inherent in Minnesota's Bill of Rights. 17 1 In none of its recent decisions,
however, has the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the protections afforded by
Article 1, Section 10.172
161. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
162. The Simpson court stated that "without automatic standing, a defendant will ordinarily
be deterred from asserting a possessory interest in illegally seized evidence because of the risk
that statement [sic] made at the suppression hearing will later be used to incriminate him albeit
under the guise of impeachment." State v. Simpson, 622 P.2d at 1206.
163. See id.
164. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
170. See State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1970) (adopting Katz reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy approach); State v. Tungland, 281 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 1979) (adhering to the
Court's decision in Rakas); State v. Guy, 298 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1980) (following Salvucci).
171. See Thiede v. Scandia Valley. 14 N.W.2d 400,405 (Minn. 1944) (recognizing inherent
property rights).
172. See Williams, supra note 13, at 1272 (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not
yet considered whether the state's constitution independently protects a person's property and
privacy rights against government intrusions).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court can broaden its search and seizure protections
because Article 1, Section 10 may be interpreted more broadly than the United
States Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. 173 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court has yet to seriously consider, however, whether its constitu-
tion provides defendants of possessory crimes with greater protection under its
search and seizure provision. 174 The Carter decision illustrates the court's reluc-
tance to adopt a more protective standard. 175
A strict adherence to the Court's privacy-based standard is misguided. The
Minnesota Supreme Court's faulty reasoning in Carter is merely one illustration
of the deficiencies of the Court's standards. Just as the property-based approach
has become obsolete, 176 so has the privacy-based standard become inadequate at
securing Fourth Amendment protections. The Minnesota Supreme Court, there-
fore, should follow the handful of states that have recently rejected the Court's
privacy-based standard. Not only is the Minnesota Supreme Court authorized to
interpret its constitution more broadly than the Court's interpretations, but recent
federal and state decisions support the notion that the court adopt a rule that is
more similar to the Jones automatic standing rule. By so doing, the Minnesota
Supreme Court can afford defendants greater protection against governmental in-
trusions.
As a number of state courts have pointed out, state courts should carefully
consider whether to apply the Court's privacy-based standard introduced by Jus-
tice Harlan in Katz. Although the Jones "legitimately on the premises" standing
rule may not be encompassing enough for state courts to apply to all fact patterns
raised under the rubric of search and seizure provisions, a standing rule that is less
fact-specific and burdensome would result in better protection against intrusive
governmental action.
Therefore, until the United States Supreme Court resolves the inadequacies of
the Fourth Amendment standards, state courts would greatly benefit from invok-
ing their own constitutions and adopting a rule more similar to the Jones automatic
standing rule. Because the Court resolved the self-incrimination dilemma in
Simmons, state courts should provide standing for all guests alleging a search.
Justice Ginsburg's analysis of the facts in Carter addresses the "guest" situation
correctly and only leaves open the issue of the fleeting visitors of a home. 177 This
173. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (recognizing the
states' powers to interpret their own constitutions more broadly than the Supreme Court's inter-
pretations). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58, 62 (1967).
Because the framers of Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution essentially en-
acted a provision identical to the federal counterpart, there is an argument that the framers in-
tended the two provisions to be similarly interpreted. See Ewers v. Thunderbird Aviation, Inc.,
289 N.W.2d 94, 99 n.6 (Minn. 1979) (recognizing that "where a constitutional or statutory pro-
vision is taken from another state ... the construction placed upon it by the court of that state is
presumed to be adopted with the provision"). This presumption is not controlling, however. See
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 81.
174. See State v. Willis, 320 N.W.2d 726,727 (Minn. 1982) (refusing to consider whether the
court should adopt automatic standing).
175. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
176. See supra Part II.B.
177. See Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct. 469, 481-82 (1998).
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approach is more harmonious with the framers' intentions and the early case law
under the Fourth Amendment and also affords greater protection against govern-
ment intrusions. Also, by adopting this uniform standard, state courts could avoid
the current confusing situation where each state is rendering its own definition of
the term "automatic standing." Finally, and most important, this Author's pro-
posed approach more adequately measures the right guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment and state search and seizure provisions: the "right of the people to be
secure." 178
Rebecca L Garrett
178. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.

